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Evidence

How a record is canonicalized, chained, sealed, timestamped and anchored, and what the receipt, the evidence report and the evidence package contain.

An Esign Comply record is meant to be evidence you can check without trusting Esign Comply's servers or your own. This page describes what makes it so: the layers of independence, the sealing pipeline, and the three artifacts you can hold: the receipt, the evidence report and the evidence package.

Records are tamper-evident: any change to the stored record after sealing is detectable. That is a statement about integrity and time. It does not establish who acted or when the act actually occurred.

The independence model

Layer What it establishes Who can defeat it
Direct browser channel Esign Comply received a request from the signer's device at a stated time, on the registered domain, carrying the stated ceremony events A customer that scripts a fake browser. Mitigated by L2 verification and the signer receipt.
Independent verification (L2, L3) A person controlling the stated email address, phone number or passkey took part in the ceremony Someone with access to the signer's mailbox, phone or device
Signer receipt The signer was sent a copy and a verification link by a third party. Disputes are recorded. Non-delivery, which is recorded as a bounce
Registered document version The text is fixed and hashed before the ceremony. The record names the hash. No one after publication: the version is immutable
Seal The record has not changed since Esign Comply signed it Compromise of the sealing key. Mitigated by external timestamps and anchoring.
External timestamp The record hash existed no later than the time stated by an outside timestamp authority Compromise of the authority
Ledger and public checkpoints Records cannot be removed, reordered or back-dated without detection, including by Esign Comply staff Collusion that also rewrites externally published checkpoints

Limits stated on every evidence report and certificate: Esign Comply did not see the signer's screen as a human would, did not verify legal identity, and did not review the agreement's content.

Sealing pipeline

Step Action Timing
E1 Canonicalize Serialize the record with the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (RFC 8785), add a random 256-bit salt, and compute SHA-256 over the salt followed by the canonical bytes In the completion request
E2 Chain Insert a ledger entry containing the record hash and the hash of the previous entry for the same domain. The ledger is append-only. Same database transaction as the record
E3 Seal Sign a receipt (JWS, ES256) over record ID, record hash, signed-at time, domain, ledger sequence and previous-entry hash. The private key stays in a managed key service. In the completion request
E4 Timestamp Request an RFC 3161 timestamp token over the record hash from an external timestamp authority. Two authorities are configured, with automatic failover. Asynchronous, target under 60 seconds
E5 Batch Add ledger entries to a per-region Merkle tree (RFC 6962 construction). Sign a checkpoint: tree size, root hash, previous root, time. Checkpoints chain. Every 60 seconds
E6 Anchor Timestamp checkpoint roots externally and write batch bundles to restricted write-once storage. Publish non-identifying aggregate commitments as public anchors. Checkpoints every 60 seconds; public anchors hourly
E7 Prove Compute and store the inclusion proof for each record against its checkpoint After E6

A record is complete evidence at E3. E4 to E7 add independent proof of time and of non-removal. The hash covers every event, every document hash and the profile version.

Quota never blocks completion of a session that has been created. If the signing key service cannot be reached, the record is still committed, the response carries status: "pending_seal" and receipt: null, and the receipt is signed within 60 seconds.

Record states

status Meaning Webhook
pending_seal Committed. The receipt is not signed yet. None
recorded The receipt is signed (E3) record.completed
timestamped The external timestamp token is attached (E4) record.timestamped
anchored Included in a signed checkpoint and a public anchor (E5 to E7) record.anchored
disputed The signer used "This was not me". The seal state underneath is unchanged. record.disputed
voided Test record purge or erasure completed. Reads return 404. None

When your server confirms a record, accept recorded, timestamped or anchored. See Server confirmation.

Test mode. Test records run the full pipeline against a separate test ledger and a test signing key. For a test record made on the Free plan no external timestamp authority is contacted: the timestamp step is simulated and is not evidence of time. Reports carry a "TEST" watermark and the statement that no attestation is given. Test records are deleted after 30 days. Live records on the Free plan go through the whole pipeline above, external timestamp included.

Receipt

A receipt is the compact proof you can store in your own database and present later. It is a JWS signed with ES256. Public keys, current and retired, are at /.well-known/jwks.json.

{
  "header": { "alg": "ES256", "kid": "esc-us-live-2026-11", "typ": "esc-receipt+jwt" },
  "payload": {
    "iss": "https://esigncomply.com",
    "rid": "rec_Z4m8",
    "dom": "example.com",
    "hash": "sha256:5be7...",
    "iat": 1795273400,
    "lvl": "simple",
    "asr": "L1",
    "seq": 18244,
    "prev": "sha256:a91c...",
    "live": true
  }
}
Claim Meaning
iss Issuer
rid Record ID
dom Registered domain the record is bound to. Test records made without a registered domain use sandbox:<domain id>.
hash Record hash
iat Signed-at time: server receipt time of the final event, in seconds
lvl signature_level: simple or not_applicable
asr Assurance level: L1, L2 or L3
seq Sequence of the record's entry in the domain ledger
prev Hash of the previous ledger entry for the domain
live true for live records. A receipt signed by a test key never verifies as live evidence.

The receipt comes back from ceremony.complete() in the browser and from GET /v1/records/{id}/receipt on your server. Store it in your own acceptances table next to the record ID. Anyone who holds the full receipt can check it with POST /v1/verify. See Verification.

Annotations, supplements and certificates get their own receipts (typ: "esc-subject-receipt+jwt") and their own ledger entries.

Evidence report

The evidence report is the human-readable PDF generated from the sealed record: GET /v1/records/{id}/report. It is included for every record on every plan and is never charged per download. Regenerating it yields the same content. It is produced in English.

Section Content
Header "Electronic Signature Evidence Report" or "Electronic Acceptance Evidence Report", record ID, verification URL and QR code, live or test mark
Parties Organization legal name and registered domain; signer details, each field labeled observed or asserted
Documents Title, version label, language, content hash
Signature or Acceptance Method, classification, assurance level, exact label and button text. IP address, raw device data and drawn strokes are omitted by default.
Timeline Server-received time and browser-reported time for each event, kept distinct. The timestamp token time is never labeled as signing time.
Presentation The measured assent region where it was captured, otherwise the registered artifact and its provenance
Disclosures and consent Where applicable: disclosure version, access demonstration, consent, withdrawal status
Delivery Receipt email time and status
Integrity Record hash, sealing key ID, timestamp authority and time, ledger sequence, checkpoint ID
Later history Annotations with times
Rules applied Packs applied with versions and reasons, the asserted signer region and governing law, the rules fired. Conditions in advise are shown as evaluated, not enforced for this record.
Limits "Our signature or seal, if present, authenticates this evidence artifact only. It is not the person's signature, a qualified certificate, or a determination of identity, authority, compliance or enforceability."
Asserted at signing (Part B) Facts you supplied with the session
Customer-supplied material (Part C) A list of supplements with both times and hashes

What the report never states:

  • That the agreement is valid or enforceable. It states what was recorded.
  • That a rule check passed or failed as a judgment. Measurements are printed. Advisory pass or fail results are not.
  • Anything about your obligations or recommendations, or whether you performed any duty.
  • That the signer read a document.

The word "certificate" is reserved for the on-request Contemporaneous Record Statement. See Certificates.

A recording_access key cannot download reports or packages, so a leaked application key cannot export stored evidence. Use a full_access or read_only key. Records sealed now are never locked for reports, packages or certificates. A record that was locked under the earlier Starter quota rule returns quota_exceeded.

Evidence package

The evidence package is a ZIP archive with everything needed to verify the record offline: GET /v1/records/{id}/evidence. By default the response is JSON with a signed download url that expires in 600 seconds. ?inline=true returns the archive itself when it is under 4 MB. ?supplements=false leaves out the customer-supplied folder.

File Content
manifest.json Package format, record ID, generation time, and the SHA-256 and size of every other file
record.json The canonical record: exactly the bytes that were hashed
seal.json Record hash, salt, status, issuer, key ID and the ledger entry
receipt.jws The signed receipt
keys/jwks.json Public sealing keys valid at seal time
timestamp.tsr, timestamp.json The RFC 3161 timestamp token and a readable summary, when timestamped
validation/tsa-chain.pem, validation/policy.json Certificates embedded in the token; the validation policy the package was produced under
inclusion-proof.json Merkle inclusion proof and the signed checkpoint, when checkpointed
anchors.json Public anchors covering the checkpoint, when anchored
documents/ manifest.json and the exact stored bytes of each document version
notice/ The captured notice data and the serialized assent region, when captured. Never execute it.
report.pdf The evidence report
annotations.json Later facts with their own seals
customer_supplied/ manifest.json and supplement content as received, kept apart from record.json
rules.json Packs, rules fired with each condition's state (enforce or advise) and result, guidance release, API version
VERIFY.md Manual verification steps and the verifier command

Run npx esigncomply-verify rec_Z4m8.zip to check a package. The format and each check are described in Verification.

What a record pins

A sealed record is fixed. It pins the API version, the profile version, the pack versions applied with their reasons, the guidance release, and each record condition's state and result. Nothing published later changes it. Later facts are added beside it, never inside it:

Addition What it is In the sealed hash
Annotation (ann_...) A later fact Esign Comply observes or enforces: disputed, consent_withdrawn, electronic_transactions_refused, paper_copy_requested, superseded, legal_hold, erased, note No. Own ledger entry and receipt.
Supplement (sup_...) Customer-supplied material No. Own ledger entry and receipt.
Certificate (crt_...) An on-request statement about the record No. Own ledger entry and receipt.
Conformance results Advisory findings No. The measurements behind them are sealed inside events[].

Signer receipt and disputes

When the signer's email is known and receipts are enabled, Esign Comply sends the signer a receipt from its own domain, with a copy and a verification link. The receipt contains a "This was not me" link. Using it adds a disputed annotation, sends record.disputed to you, and shows the dispute on the evidence report. Esign Comply does not adjudicate disputes. Bounces are recorded and sent as record.copy_bounced.

Retention in brief

  • Evidence content is kept for up to 10 years while you are subscribed. That is standard capacity, not a legal term. EU customers choose a documented schedule.
  • Where a rule records a retention floor on the record (retention_floor), content is not deleted before the floor expires. The longest floor among applied packs wins.
  • Bulk export of all evidence packages is available at any time on every paid plan. After cancellation, records remain exportable for 12 months.
  • Erasing a signer removes the content and leaves the hash, the seal and the ledger entry. Reads then return content_available: false.
  • Sealing keys are rotated annually. Retired public keys stay published permanently.
  • The verifier is open source, and exported packages verify offline with the bundled keys.

The statutory retention duty usually sits with you. Keep your exported copies where another law requires you to keep a record.